Laying Siege to Faith in the Digital Age
An Analysis of the Suppression of Chinese House Churches Through the 2025 Crackdown on Beijing Zion Church
This article was written by a guest author and translated by Human Rights in China. 后附中文版。
Author | Calvin
I. Unprecedented Nationwide Political Action
On October 9, 2025, a highly unusual religious crackdown began in China. Jin Mingri, the senior pastor of Beijing Zion Church, along with more than twenty pastors, preachers, and core staff members, were detained by police simultaneously. They were arrested in multiple locations including Beijing, Guangdong, Sichuan, and Shaanxi, and taken to Beihai, Guangxi for detention. This method of law enforcement, involving multiple provinces and cities, simultaneous arrests, and centralized detention, is extremely rare in the history of Chinese house churches. Shortly thereafter, from late 2025 into 2026, hundreds of church members in the Yayang area of Zhejiang were also arrested in a concentrated operation, and the Chengdu Autumn Rain Covenant Church, which had previously experienced repression, was targeted once again. Several Autumn Rain staff members, including Li Yingqiang, were arrested. This sequence of events indicates that this operation was not an isolated incident, but a systematic crackdown that is being continuously implemented.
Since Zion Church’s main venue was seized and its seminary was forced to close in 2018, the church has been under long-term high-pressure surveillance. However, the October 2025 action, in terms of its level of mobilization, scale of execution, and its political signals, clearly exceeded the scope of previous local government “stability maintenance” law enforcement.1 This was no longer a routine crackdown on a “religious group that refused to be managed,” but a highly coordinated nationwide political action with a clear strategic intent.
Over the past thirty years of religious governance practices in China, even during the “cross-removal campaign” in Zhejiang2 or the suppression of large house churches in various locations, the enforcement power was mainly in the hands of local party committees and public security systems, with the central government playing more of a policy-setting and tacit approval role. In contrast, this nationwide coordinated action across multiple provinces and cities, with simultaneous timing and centralized detention locations, can almost certainly be attributed not to the spontaneous actions of local governments, but to the coordinated design of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership.
Thus, a key question arises: Why now? Why Zion Church? Why did the method of suppression escalate from long-term, localized, and fragmented actions to a nationwide, simultaneous, and concentrated crackdown?
II. A Shift in Governance Logic: From “Local Religious Issues” to “Networked Risks”
To answer this question, we must move beyond a single-event perspective and examine the changes in the overall structure of Chinese house churches.
Under a continuously tightening policy environment, a large number of house churches have undergone a profound transformation in recent years: from physical churches centered on specific locations to online, networked structures highly dependent on digital technology. Churches are no longer concentrated in a single fixed location, but instead connect small gathering points scattered across different cities, communities, and families into a unified whole through video conferencing, instant messaging tools, and online courses.
This model used technology to significantly enhance the mobility, secrecy, and cross-regional expansion capabilities of the churches, while organizationally weakening the effectiveness of traditional control methods used by local governments, such as shutting down venues and cutting off utilities. However, it is precisely this structural change that has transformed house churches from “objects of local governance” to “national risks” in the eyes of the CCP.
A religious network that is not controlled by the government, yet can spread rapidly through the internet and form a unified identity and stable organizational structure nationwide, directly strikes at the most sensitive nerve within the CCP’s logic of governance.
III. House Churches After June Fourth, 1989: Political Disillusionment and the Reconstruction of Faith
To understand the spiritual temperament and political implications of contemporary Chinese house churches, we must trace back to the historical rupture after 1989.
The June Fourth massacre was not only an act political repression, but also a profound ideological collapse. For an entire generation of Chinese intellectuals, it marked the complete collapse of their dreams of reform within the system. Between tanks and silence, many began to realize that the pursuit of freedom, justice, and dignity could no longer be entrusted to official ideology.
It is against this backdrop that Christianity gradually became an important intellectual resource for some urban intellectuals to re-conceptualize personal dignity, moral responsibility, and public order. Whether in mainland China or among overseas exile communities, many of those who experienced the 1989 democracy movement and the June Fourth massacre turned to Christian faith and even became key founders of house churches.
The founders of Beijing Zion Church and Shouwang Church completed their ideological transformation in this historical context. Jin Mingri, Jin Tianming, and others directly participated in the Tiananmen protests; and Wang Yi, pastor of the Chengdu Autumn Rain Covenant Church, was also deeply influenced by the June Fourth Incident.
Therefore, the religious choices of this generation of house church leaders were not an escape from politics, but rather a fundamental response to power, conscience, and order after political disillusionment, leading them to dedicate their lives completely to Jesus.
IV. From “Gray-Zone Tolerance” to “Systematic Elimination”: The Comprehensive Tightening of the Policy Environment
For a period of time after June Fourth, Chinese house churches were able to survive in a legal gray area: not recognized, but also not systematically eliminated. However, this state of affairs has gradually come to an end over the past decade.
After Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, official thought clearly shifted towards securitization and the creation of an “us vs. them” mentality. The People’s Daily proposed the so-called “five new blacklist categories,” lumping underground religion together with human rights lawyers and dissidents as so-called tools for “Western infiltration of China.” In 2014, the “Sinicization of Christianity” policy was officially proposed, requiring Christianity to fully submit to the Party’s ideological leadership at the theological, organizational, and practical levels; a national security research report released in the same year also for the first time explicitly defined Christianity as a potential threat from a national security perspective.
The revised 2018 “Regulations on Religious Affairs” and subsequent series of online religious management regulations provided the institutional basis for the comprehensive crackdown on house churches. Religious activities are no longer merely administrative violations, but can be elevated to criminal offenses at any time.
The removal of crosses in Zhejiang; the forced demolition of the Golden Lampstand Church in Linfen and the heavy sentencing of Lampstand pastor Yang Rongli; the banning of the Autumn Rain Church in Chengdu and the sentencing of pastor Wang Yi for “inciting subversion of state power”; Beijing Shouwang Church being forced to hold its gatherings either outdoors or online for an extended period of time—these cases collectively constitute a clear policy trajectory: house churches are being systematically excluded from legitimate social spaces.
V. The Paradox of Technology: How Online Platforms Transform from Refuge to Prison
After their physical gathering spaces were destroyed, online platforms became nearly the only path of survival for house churches. After Zion Church’s main place of worship was shut down in 2018, it quickly moved to Zoom. During the pandemic, it shared its worship links with the public. Sunday sermons often attracted tens of thousands of people online simultaneously, forming a de facto nationwide church network.
However, under China’s highly centralized information governance system, this online shift did not truly escape state control. WeChat’s centralized architecture, payment system, and data retention mechanisms meant that chat records, donation information, and interpersonal interactions became readily available material for constructing criminal evidence.3
The nationwide coordinated detentions in October 2025 were a concentrated manifestation of this logic. The subsequent formal arrest notices issued under the charge of “illegally using information networks” clearly indicated that the authorities had classified the online activities of house churches as criminal behavior.
VI. The Real Threat: Social Organizational Capacity and Value Reproduction
The authorities’ deeper anxiety does not stem from worship activities themselves, but from the potential social organization capabilities of house churches. Many house churches have established complete educational systems, including Christian classical schools, online education programs, and youth training mechanisms, creating rich social communities outside the party-state system—perhaps one of the only real living communities outside the state apparatus. Christianity itself, by taking people in Chinese society who are falsely joined through state ideology and instead uniting them as “brothers and sisters” in Christ, represents a blatant challenge to the Party’s control over the minds of the masses.
For a regime that relies heavily on ideological monopoly and organizational control to maintain its rule, this independent moral authority with mechanisms for intergenerational transmission poses a fundamental challenge. This is why the authorities continue to block Bible-related software, expel foreign missionaries, and prohibit minors from participating in religious activities.
VII. Faith, Dignity, and a Potential Starting Point for China’s Future
The Christian theological doctrine of “man created in the image of God” (imago Dei) provides a foundation for individual dignity that transcends the state and power, directly negating the absolute nature of any political authority, and historically promoting the development of the rule of law, representative government, and accountable politics.
In China, the autonomous structures, mutual aid networks, and moral authority formed by house churches during long-term persecution, in fact, constitute a parallel form of social organization to the party-state system. Whether its future path leans more towards institutional reform or a spiritual mobilization model, one thing is clear: the underground church, with its tens of millions of followers, has become a variable that cannot be ignored or easily eliminated in China’s future social transformation.
Under the comprehensive containment of the digital age, the faith communities and traditions of self-governance nurtured by China’s house churches may well be one of the key intellectual sources for rebuilding dignity, responsibility, and public order in a future China.
数字时代的信仰围堵
——从北京锡安教会 2025 年全国协同抓捕看中国家庭教会的压制逻辑
撰文 | 加尔文 (Calvin)
一、一次打破惯例的全国性政治行动
2025 年 10 月 9 日，中国发生了一次极不寻常的宗教打压行动。北京锡安教会主任牧师金明日及二十余名牧师、传道人和核心同工，在北京、广东、四川、陕西等多地被警方同步带走，随后统一押往广西北海关押。这种跨省市、同时间节点、集中关押地点的执法方式，在中国家庭教会历史上极为罕见。此后，从 2025 年年末至 2026 年初，浙江雅阳地区又有上百名教徒被集中抓捕，成都秋雨圣约教会亦再度遭到打压，包括李英强在内的多位教牧人员相继被捕，显示出这一轮行动并非孤立事件，而是持续推进的系统性清剿。
自 2018 年锡安教会主堂被查封、神学院被迫关闭以来，教会已长期处于高压监管之下。然而，2025 年 10 月的行动，无论在动员层级、执行规模，还是政治信号上，都明显超出了以往地方政府“维稳式执法”的范畴。这已不再是对某一“不服从管理宗教团体”的常规打压，而是一场高度协调、具有明确战略意图的全国性政治行动。
在过去三十年的中国宗教治理实践中，即便是浙江“拆十字架运动”或各地取缔大型家庭教会，具体执行权仍主要掌握在地方党委与公安系统手中，中央更多扮演政策定调与默许角色。相比之下，此次跨省市、统一时间节点、集中关押地点的全国协同行动，几乎可以确定并非地方政府的自发行为，而是来自中共高层的统筹设计。
由此，一个关键问题浮现出来：为什么是现在？为什么是锡安教会？为什么打压方式会从长期的地方化、碎片化行动，升级为全国同步的集中打击？
二、治理逻辑的转向：从“地方宗教问题”到“网络化风险”
要回答这一问题，必须跳出单一事件视角，从中国家庭教会整体结构的变化入手。
在持续收紧的政策环境下，近年来大量家庭教会逐渐完成了一次深刻转型：从以堂点为中心的实体教会，转向高度依赖数字技术的线上化、网络化结构。教会不再集中于某一固定场所，而是通过视频会议、即时通讯工具和在线课程，将分散在不同城市、不同社区、不同家庭的小型聚会点联结为一个整体。
这种模式在技术上显著提高了教会的流动性、隐蔽性与跨区域扩展能力，在组织上则削弱了地方政府通过封场地、断水电等传统手段进行控制的有效性。然而，正是这种结构性变化，使家庭教会从“地方治理对象”转变为中共眼中的“全国性风险”。
一个不受官方控制、却能够通过网络迅速扩散、在全国范围内形成统一认同和稳定组织结构的宗教网络，直接触及了中共治理逻辑中最敏感的神经。
三、八九六四之后的家庭教会：政治幻灭与信仰重建
要理解当代中国家庭教会的精神气质与政治含义，必须回溯到 1989 年之后的历史断裂。
六四屠杀不仅是一次政治镇压，更是一场深刻的思想崩塌。对一整代中国知识分子而言，那标志着体制内改革理想的彻底破产。在坦克与沉默之间，许多人开始意识到，对自由、公义与尊严的追求，已无法再寄托于官方意识形态。
正是在这一背景下，基督教逐渐成为部分城市知识分子重新理解个人尊严、道德责任与公共秩序的重要思想资源。无论是在中国本土，还是在海外流亡群体中，经历过八九民运与六四屠杀的人，纷纷转向基督信仰，并成为家庭教会的重要奠基者。
北京锡安教会与守望教会的创立者，正是在这一历史语境中完成思想转折。金明日、金天明等人曾直接参与天安门抗议；而成都秋雨圣约教会牧师王怡也被六四事件深深影响。
因此，这一代家庭教会领袖的宗教选择，并非逃避政治，而恰恰是在政治幻灭之后，对权力、良知与秩序的根本回应，才将一生完全奉献给耶稣基督。
四、从“灰色容忍”到“系统清除”：政策环境的全面收紧
在六四后的一段时间里，中国家庭教会得以在法律灰色地带中生存：不被承认，但也未被系统性清除。然而，这种状态在过去十余年中逐步终结。
2012 年习近平上台后，官方意识形态明显转向安全化与敌我化。《人民日报》提出所谓“新黑五类”，将地下宗教与维权律师、异见人士并列为“西方渗透中国”的工具；2014 年，“基督教中国化”政策正式提出，要求基督教在神学、组织与实践层面全面服从党的意识形态领导；同年发布的国家安全研究报告，也首次从国家安全角度将基督教明确定位为潜在威胁。
2018 年修订的《宗教事务条例》以及随后出台的一系列互联网宗教管理法规，为对家庭教会的全面打压提供了制度基础。宗教活动不再只是行政违规，而是可以被随时上升为刑事问题。
浙江“拆十字架运动”、临汾金灯台教会被强拆并重判杨荣丽、成都秋雨教会被取缔并以“煽动颠覆国家政权罪”判刑王怡、北京守望教会被迫长期转入户外与线上聚会——这些案例共同构成了一条清晰的政策轨迹：家庭教会正被系统性地排除出合法社会空间。
五、技术的悖论：线上化如何从庇护变成枷锁
在实体聚会空间被摧毁之后，线上化几乎成为家庭教会唯一的生存路径。锡安教会在 2018 年主堂被封后，迅速转向 ZOOM平台，并在疫情期间向公众开放礼拜链接，主日讲道往往吸引上万人同时在线，形成事实上的全国性教会网络。
然而，在中国高度中心化的信息治理体系下，这种线上化并未真正逃离国家控制。微信的中心化架构、支付系统与数据留存机制，使聊天记录、奉献信息与人员往来，反而成为构造刑事证据的现成材料。
2025 年 10 月的全国协同抓捕，正是这一逻辑的集中体现。随后以“非法利用信息网络罪”发出的正式逮捕通知，清楚表明：当局已将家庭教会的线上活动本身定性为犯罪行为。
六、真正的威胁：社会组织能力与价值再生产
为当局更深层的不安，并非单纯来自敬拜活动，而是来自家庭教会在社会组织层面的潜力。许多家庭教会已建立起完整的教育体系，包括基督教古典学校、线上教育项目与青年培养机制，在党国体系之外创建丰富的社会共同体，是在国家体制意外几乎唯一的真实的生活群体。基督教的本身，在中国社会被虚假的意识形态中将大家链接成基督里的“兄弟姐妹，”可见对党的群众意识的公然挑战。
对于一个高度依赖意识形态垄断与组织控制维系统治的政权而言，这种独立的道德权威与代际传承机制，具有根本性的挑战意义。这也是为何当局持续封锁圣经软件、驱逐外国传教士、禁止未成年人参与宗教活动。
七、信仰、尊严与中国未来的潜在起点
基督教神学中“人按神的形象被造”（imago Dei）的教义，为个人尊严提供了超越国家与权力的根基，直接否定任何政治权威的绝对性，并在历史上推动了法治、代议制与责任政治的发展。
在中国，家庭教会在长期逼迫中形成的自治结构、互助网络与道德权威，事实上构成了一套与党国体系平行的社会组织形态。无论其未来路径更接近制度化改革，还是灵性动员模式，有一点已十分清楚：拥有数千万信徒的地下教会，已成为中国未来社会转型中一个无法被忽视、也无法被简单清除的变量。
在数字时代的全面围堵之下，中国家庭教会所孕育的信仰共同体与自治传统，或许正是未来中国重建尊严、责任与公共秩序的重要思想源头之一。
Editor’s note: Stability maintenance (weiwen 维稳) is a policy and strategic method used by the CCP to manage what it perceives as threats to the political and social status quo. It has frequently been used as justification for repressing speech on human rights topics.
Tom Phillips, “China’s Christians Protest ‘evil’ Communist Campaign to Tear down Crosses,” The Guardian, July 27, 2015. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/27/chinas-christians-protest-evil-communist-campaign-to-tear-down-crosses.
Editor’s note: In China, it is extremely common to use the WeChat app for communication, payment, and a myriad of other purposes. Therefore, many house churches relied on WeChat to distribute information about services and engage in other day-to-day church operations.
They are anti-Gay. The security of Gays in China depends on the Chinese government keeping this menace under control. These Christians don't believe in human rights.